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Sailor Music v. IML Corp.,
867 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. MICH. 1994).
INTRODUCTION
The plaintiffs, members of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers ("ASCAP"), brought suit against the corporate owner of a bar and
grill and its principal shareholders for playing copyrighted material without au-
thorization. Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, con-
tending there was no genuine issue of material fact presented, and the defendants
failed to respond. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan held that the bar had violated musical copyrights and the principal
shareholders were personally liable for this infringement.
FACTS
The plaintiffs are the owners of copyrighted musical compositions who have
granted to ASCAP a non-exclusive right to license non-dramatic public perfor-
mances of their music. The defendants are IML Corporation ("IML"), a Michi-
gan corporation, and its principal shareholders, Geraldine and Alfred Bensmiller.
In January 1990, IML opened "Marilyn's on Monroe" ("Marilyn's"), a bar and
grill which plays live disc jockey music.
Soon after Marilyn's opened, ASCAP and the Bensmillers engaged in negotia-
tions for the bar to obtain a license to play ASCAP songs. However, the
Bensmillers refused to purchase a license for Marilyn's. ASCAP then sent two of
its representatives to Marilyn's to ascertain whether the bar was playing songs
without a license. The representatives confirmed ASCAP's suspicions that
Marilyn's was playing copyrighted material without authorization.
Thereafter, ASCAP confronted Marilyn's owners with the results of its inves-
tigation. ASCAP offered to forego litigation if the Bensmillers would agree to
pay for the years in which they had played copyrighted music without a license
and bought a current license. The Bensmillers refused, and ASCAP brought suit.
ASCAP's complaint charged the defendants with five counts of copyright
infringement and sought an injunction prohibiting the defendants from further
infringing ASCAP's rights, statutory damages of $2,000 per infringement, and
attorney's fees. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment, con-
tending there were no genuine issues of material fact. The defendants failed to
submit opposition pleadings to this motion.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In determining whether to grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs,
the court first looked to whether there was a genuine issue of material fact re-
garding the existence of copyright infringement. Beyond proving that perfor-
mance of copyrighted songs occurred, the following elements must be estab-
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lished: (1) the originality and authorship of the compositions involved; (2) com-
pliance with the formalities of the Copyright Act; (3) ownership of copyrights;
(4) performance of compositions for profit; and (5) unauthorized performance.'
In the present case, the court found that the first three elements were satisfied
when the plaintiffs submitted copies of copyright registration for the five songs
at issue. The court further found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated that perfor-
mance of the songs was unauthorized and was done for commercial purposes and
profit.
The court next addressed whether the Bensmillers could be held personally
liable as corporate officers, i.e., whether piercing of the corporate veil was justi-
fied in this case. Under the Copyright Act, a corporate officer may be held vicar-
iously liable if: (1) the officer personally participated in the actual infringement;
(2) the officer derived financial benefit from the infringing activities; (3) the
officer used the corporation as an instrument to carry out a deliberate infringe-
ment; (4) the officer was the dominant influence in the corporation and deter-
mined the policies which resulted in the infringement; or (5) on the basis of
some combination of the above criteria.2
Here, the court held that the Bensmillers should be personally liable for sever-
al reasons. As the sole owners of IML, they derived financial benefit from the
infringing activities. Moreover, Mrs. Bensmiller was the dominant influence in
IML and the officer who determined the policies at Marylin's which resulted in
the infringement. She had owned another bar which held an ASCAP license, and
thus, knew or should have known that playing copyrighted songs without the
license would violate copyright laws. Finally, it was Mrs. Bensmiller who told
ASCAP that an ASCAP license would not be obtained despite ASCAP's warn-
ings. The court further found that Mr. Bensmiller could be held responsible
because he acted as general manager of Marilyn's and was responsible for the
policy of neglect which resulted in infringement.
Citing to that portion of the Copyright Act which allows courts to exercise
discretion in granting injunctive relief,3 the court discussed whether such relief
was proper in this case. Courts generally grant permanent injunctions once liabil-
ity has been established if there is "a substantial likelihood of further infringe-
ment."4 Because Marilyn's continued to play copyrighted material without a
license despite the knowledge that one was required, the court found that a per-
manent injunction was justified by the substantial likelihood of further infringe-
ment.
The court next decided whether the statutory damages requested by the plain-
tiffs were appropriate. The Copyright Act allows recovery for up to $20,000 per
infringement as the court considers just.5 One of the purposes for these damages
1. Blendingwell Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474, 479-480 (D. Del. 1985).
2. Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. Partnership, 830 F. Supp. 651, 654-55 (D. Mass. 1993).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
4. Pedrosillo Music v. Radio Musical, Inc., 815 F. Supp. 511, 516 (D.P.R. 1993) (citing Jobete
Music Co. v. Media Broadcasting Corp., 713 F. Supp. 174, 179 (M.D.N.C. 1988)).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (c)(1) (1994).
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is to discourage wrongful conduct.6 In determining the amount of statutory dam-
ages, a court should consider the expenses saved and profits reaped by the defen-
dants in connection with the infringement and the willfulness of the infringe-
ment
In the present case, the plaintiffs sought $2,000 per infringement and in sup-
port of this, submitted a survey of statutory awards indicating that courts typical-
ly award three times the amount of a purchased license per infringement. Be-
cause the violations here resulted from deliberate indifference toward copyright
laws and the amount was proper, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs.
Finally, the court addressed the plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees and
costs. In considering whether to award costs and attorney's fees, courts may look
to whether (1) litigation was justified by a complex or novel issue; (2) the defen-
dants attempted to avoid the infringement; or (3) the act of infringement was
innocent! Noting that the Copyright Act grants courts discretion to award costs
and attorney's fees,9 the court found that the facts of this case clearly warranted
such an award in favor of the plaintiffs. The infringement was blatant in that
they chose to disregard the plaintiffs' rights to the copyrighted material. Further,
they refused ASCAP's multiple offers to forego litigation in exchange for pay-
ment of ASCAP's dues. Thus, they forced the plaintiffs to engage lawyers and
incur litigation costs to defend their rights.
CONCLUSION
Having found no issue of material fact as to the occurrence of a copyright
violation, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court further held that
the principal shareholders of the corporation owning Marilyn's were personally
liable for the infringement. Finally, the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction
prohibiting the bar from using any musical compositions in ASCAP's repertoire,
a statutory award of $2,000 per infringement and attorneys fees and costs.
Danica Irvine
6. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952).
7. See Marvin Music Co. v. BHC Ltd. Partnership, 830 F. Supp. 651, 656 (D. Mass. 1993).
8. Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908, 915 (D. Conn. 1980).
9. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
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